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1. PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY MEETS SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM 
Philip Brey, Twente University 
Social constructivist approaches in technology studies have recently gained the attention of 
philosophers of technology, as is shown by a number of publications (e.g., Mitcham, 1995; Feenberg 
and Hannay, 1995; Winner, 1991, 1994; Feenberg, 1992, 1995). Whereas the aim of some of these 
studies is to provide a philosophical critique of social constructivism (e.g., Winner, 1991), others aim 
to incorporate notions and ideas of social constructivism into the philosophy of technology (e.g., 
Feenberg, 1992, 1995). The aim of this essay is not to (merely) critique social constructivism, nor is it 
to incorporate social constructivist notions into a philosophical analysis of technology. Its aim is, 
rather, to ask and (provisionally) answer two questions concerning the potential implications of social 
constructivism for philosophy of technology: (1) Could the philosophy of technology benefit from 
social constructivist approaches in technology studies through an incorporation of some of their 
analyses, concepts, and theories? (2) If so, how would the philosophy of technology be transformed as 
a result?2 These two questions cannot be answered properly without an evaluation of the weak and 
strong points of both current philosophy of technology and current social constructivist technology 
studies. A large part of this essay will be devoted to such an assessment.  
In asking how the philosophy of technology may benefit from social constructivism, I am assuming 
that an agenda of relevant issues and research questions in the philosophy of technology already 
exists. The philosophy of technology was and is concerned with philosophical questions concerning 
the nature of technology, and the impact of technology on things of value: the human psyche, society, 
culture, and the environment. The expected role of social constructivist studies would therefore be to 
better help the philosophy of technology answer such questions. The possibility should not be 
excluded, however, that a consideration of these studies shows that certain traditional questions in the 
philosophy of technology are misconceived because they are based on false empirical presuppositions 
and hence need to be discarded, that other questions need to be rephrased, and that novel philosophical 
questions present themselves.  
In the next section, the case will be made that the philosophy of technology ought to pay more serious 
attention to empirical studies of technology, and that, among such studies, social constructivist studies 
have special appeal for the philosophy of technology. In section 3, social constructivist approaches in 
technology studies will be characterized briefly, and three varieties of social constructivism, broadly 
defined, will be distinguished: strong and mild social constructivism, and actor-network theory. 
Section 4 contains a critique of current social constructivist technology studies, taking as its point of 
departure an influential earlier critique of social constructivism by Langdon Winner (1991). Section 5 
provides a critical discussion of both mild social constructivism and actor-network theory, their 
divergences from mainstream philosophy of technology, and their potential implications for the 
philosophy of technology. Section 6 does the same for strong social constructivism. The balance is 
drawn in section 7.  
2. THE POTENTIAL RELEVANCE OF SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVIST STUDIES FOR THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY  
One criticism sometimes leveled at the philosophy of technology is that its theories tend to be abstract, 
and say a lot about "technology," "society," and "humanity," but little about particular technologies 
and their impacts, and particular social controversies in which technology plays a role. A second 
criticism that is sometimes voiced is that theories in the philosophy of technology often make or 
presuppose empirically testable claims, but that these claims are often not based on, or supported by, 
empirical evidence. Worse, some of its recurring empirical claims have been claimed to be false. In 
particular, technological determinist conceptions of technological change presupposed in many 
philosophical studies of technology (e.g., Ellul, 1954; Winner, 1977; Gehlen, 1980) have been claimed 
to be empirically inadequate (e.g., MacKenzie and Wajcman, 1985a; Pinch and Bijker, 1987; Noble, 
1984). As Pinch and Bijker (1987) have claimed, the philosophy of technology is in need of "more 
realistic models of both science and technology" (p. 19).  
Empirical studies of technologies and their impacts may be useful to the philosophy of technology, I 
claim, by aiding the philosophy of technology in arriving at analyses that are more concrete and 
detailed, and that are empirically more realistic. They can help the philosophy of technology to arrive 
at empirically more realistic theories by supporting or rejecting empirical claims made or presupposed 
by theories in the philosophy of technology, such as claims about technological change and 
technological innovation, the way technology impacts society, and the characteristics of different 
types of technology, and by suggesting alternative empirical claims. These two functions of empirical 
studies of technology may be summed up by claiming that such studies are able to provide 
philosophical theories with micro-elaborations of their claims and concepts: insofar as philosophical 
claims and concepts have an empirical component, this empirical component may be corroborated, 
amended, or replaced by the empirical concepts and claims of empirical studies of technology. Micro-
elaborations are particularly important for studies in social and political philosophy of technology and 
technology ethics, because such studies typically presuppose some empirical model of technology 
dynamics. They can also prove relevant for other areas in the philosophy of technology.3  
Philosophical studies of technology that presuppose some conception of technological change would 
consequently be improved, I claim, by incorporating empirically informed models of technological 
change. Because the currently most influential models of technological change in technology studies 
are arguably social constructivist models, these models are a prime candidate for incorporation into 
the philosophy of technology. Moreover, the potential relevance of social constructivist models of 
technological change for the philosophy of technology does not remain limited to their analysis of 
technological innovation. These models also contain (often implicit) accounts of the way in which 
technology impacts society. They show that technological innovation does not take a linear path from 
theory to application to introduction of the technology into society, but is instead influenced by social 
choices at every point. Consequently, technologies bear the imprint of the social processes that have 
brought them forth.  
Because it is during its development stage that many of the social and cultural effects of a new 
technology are determined, through various processes of social negotiation and interpretation, it 
becomes important for philosophical studies of the impact of technology on society and culture to take 
a closer look at this development stage. Only if technology evolved according to some internal logic, 
and had its social and cultural effects conditioned by this logic, or if technologies were strictly neutral, 
would it be justified to ignore this development stage, because it would then suffice to study this logic, 
or to study the choices that societies make after a technology has been developed. If their models of 
technological change are correct, however, social constructivist studies could be helpful in revealing 
how the social and cultural impacts of a technology correspond to decisions made during its 
development stage. In this way, they could help the philosophy of technology to better understand 
these impacts.  
3. A BRIEF GUIDE TO SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVIST TECHNOLOGY STUDIES  
Social constructivist approaches are currently influential in both science studies and technology 
studies. The label "social constructivism" is used to refer to a variety of related, predominantly 
sociological approaches in science and technology studies. The roots of many, though not all, of these 
approaches lie in the sociology of knowledge (Bloor, 1976), and many social constructivists who now 
study technology have their roots in science studies, only to have turned to technology later on (see 
Woolgar, 1991). The starting point of social constructivist technology studies can be placed in the 
mid-eighties (see Bijker, Hughes, and Pinch, 1987). Since then, this paradigm has yielded dozens of 
books and hundreds of articles, most of them socio-historical case studies of technological innovation 
and technological change.  
The term "social constructivism" is sometimes used in a narrow sense, to refer to the influential Social 
Construction of Technology (SCOT) approach that was outlined originally in Pinch and Bijker (1987) 
and Bijker (1987), and a number of related approaches, such as those of Collins (1985) and Woolgar 
(1991). In a broader sense, which will be used throughout this essay, the term also includes what are 
called "social shaping" approaches (e.g., MacKenzie and Wajcman, 1985a, 1985b; MacKenzie, 1990), 
and the actor-network approach of Bruno Latour, Michel Callon, and John Law, and their followers 
(e.g., Callon, 1987; Latour, 1987).  
There are different approaches in social constructivism, but they have a family resemblance to one 
another. Although there are few features that they all have in common, there are some features that are 
fairly typical. First, social constructivism includes a conception of technological development as a 
contingent process, involving heterogeneous factors. Accordingly, technological change cannot be 
analyzed as following a fixed, unidirectional path, and cannot be explained by reference to economic 
laws or some inner technological "logic." Rather, technological change is best explained by reference 
to a number of technological controversies, disagreements, and difficulties, that involve different 
actors (individuals or groups that are capable of acting) or relevant social groups, which are groups of 
actors that share a common conceptual framework and common interests. These actors or groups 
engage in strategies to win from the opposition and to shape technology according to their own plan.  
Social constructivist approaches typically employ a principle of methodological symmetry, or 
methodological relativism (Pinch and Bijker, 1987; see Pels, 1996). This principle, in its most 
common form, implies that the analyst remains impartial as to the "real" properties of her object of 
analysis, viz. technology. This implies, among other things, that the analyst does not evaluate any of 
the knowledge claims made by different social groups about the "real" properties of the technology 
under study. This principle was originally formulated in the sociology of knowledge (Bloor, 1976), 
where it was motivated by the idea that in a sociological explanation of claims to (scientific) 
knowledge, it is both possible and desirable to remain agnostic about any role of "the world" in 
settling scientific controversies. Instead, the analyst should analyze putatively true and false claims 
symmetrically, explaining them by reference to similar (sociological) factors. Such agnosticism is held 
to be desirable because the analyst is claimed to have no independent access to the world, and hence 
no independent way of evaluating knowledge claims of scientists and others. Such agnosticism is 
claimed to be possible because it is conjectured that the world plays a small or even nonexistent role 
in settling controversies between different knowledge claimants, and that social factors are much more 
important.  
As a consequence of this principle, when applied to technology, the analyst will generally avoid 
making claims about the true nature of technology, including claims about the (in)operativity of 
artifacts, technological (in)efficiency, success or failure in technical change, the (ir)rationality of 
technological choices and procedures, technological progress, the real function or purpose of an 
artifact, and intrinsic effects of technology. Because the analyst avoids reference to real properties of a 
technology, moreover, such properties cannot be invoked to explain technological change. For 
example, no reference should be made to the actual properties of an artifact in explaining its 
commercial success, or its selection out of a pool of several other designs (see Staudenmaier, 1995).  
The outcome of the process of controversy and strategy mapping that surrounds technical change is 
the stabilization of a technology, together with concomitant ("co-produced") social relations. 
Stabilization of a technology implies that its contents are "black-boxed," and are no longer a site for 
controversy. Its stabilized properties come to determine the way that the technology functions in 
society. Most social constructivists, including SCOT scholars, attribute the stabilization of an artifact 
to an agreement or settlement between different social groups, which arrive at a similar interpretation 
of a technology, as the result of a series of controversies and negotiations. Technology is claimed by 
these social constructivists to have interpretive flexibility: it has no objective, fixed properties, but 
allows for different interpretations, not only of its functional and social-cultural properties but also of 
its technical content, that is, the way it works. Facts about a technology are hence not objectively 
given by the technology itself, but are determined by the interpretations of relevant social groups. The 
rhetorical process of agreement on the true nature of a technology as the outcome of negotiation and 
social action is called closure. Technology is hence socially shaped or socially constructed: its 
properties are largely if not exclusively determined by the interpretive frameworks and negotiations of 
relevant social groups.  
The above broad characterization of social constructivist technology studies obscures the fact that a 
variety of approaches exists, between which there are important differences. There have been various 
attempts at classifying different approaches within social constructivism (e.g., Bijker and Law, 1992a; 
Sismondo, 1993; Collins and Yearley, 1992; Woolgar, 1991; Grint and Woolgar, 1995). The 
following taxonomy of three (broad) approaches is loosely based on these attempts.4  
The most characteristic variety of social constructivism in technology studies may be called strong 
social constructivism. This approach is the one aligned most closely with the sociology of scientific 
knowledge, and includes the SCOT-approach, as well as the work of such scholars as H. M. Collins 
and Steve Woolgar. It vigorously upholds the principle of symmetry, and hence avoids all reference to 
the actual character of technology in its analyses. Technological change is to be explained by 
reference to social practices, particularly by reference to processes of interpretation, negotiation, and 
closure by different actors and social groups. Technology is a genuine social construction, that is, a 
stabilized technology can only be explained by reference to the social elements (including other 
socially constructed entities) that have produced its stabilization. No "properties," "powers," or 
"effects" can be attributed to technologies themselves.  
Mild social constructivism is the label that will be used to characterize more moderate approaches, 
that sometimes go under the name of "social shaping" approaches (e.g., MacKenzie and Wajcman, 
1985a, 1985b; MacKenzie, 1990).5 Social shaping approaches retain conventional distinctions, 
between the social and the natural, and between the social and the technical, and study the way in 
which social factors shape technology. They do not reject a role for nonsocial factors in technological 
change, and are also willing to attribute properties and effects to technology, although these properties 
and effects are usually claimed to be defined relative to a particular social context. Because 
technologies are socially shaped, these properties and effects are in large part social properties and 
social effects, that can be attributed to social biases or politics "built into" or "embodied by" these 
technologies.  
Actor-network theory, sometimes simply called "constructivism" (without the "social"), is a third 
influential approach. It studies stabilization processes of technical and scientific objects as these result 
from the building of actor networks, which are networks of human actors and natural and technical 
phenomena. Actor-network theorists employ a principle of generalized symmetry, according to which 
any element (social, natural, or technical) in a heterogeneous network of entities that participate in the 
stabilization of a technology has a similar explanatory role (Callon, 1987; Latour, 1987; Callon and 
Latour, 1992). Strong social constructivism is criticized for giving special preference to social 
elements, such as social groups and interpretation processes, on which its explanations are based, 
whereas natural or technical elements, such as natural forces and technical devices are prohibited from 
being explanatory elements in explanations. Actor-network theory also allows for technical devices 
and natural forces to be actors (or "actants") in networks through which technical or scientific objects 
are stabilized. By an analysis of actor networks, any entity can be shown to be a post hoc construction, 
but entities are not normally socially constructed, because stabilization is not the result only of social 
factors.  
4. UPON OPENING THE BLACK BOX SIX YEARS LATER AND FINDING IT FILLING UP: 
CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY  
Social constructivist technology studies have been under attack from different quarters for being an 
inadequate approach to technology studies. Before applying such studies to their own work, therefore, 
philosophers of technology should carefully consider arguments about their flaws and limitations. 
Some of the main criticisms against social constructivist technology studies were voiced six years ago, 
in an influential article by Langdon Winner, called, "Upon Opening the Black Box and Finding It 
Empty: Social Constructivism and the Philosophy of Technology" (Winner, 1991). Winner's 
criticisms, in summary, are as follows:  
(1) By focusing on processes of technological innovation, social constructivist studies tend to 
disregard the social consequences of technical choice.  
(2) Social constructivism tends to recognize only social groups that have a role in "constructing" 
technology, and not social groups that are impacted by technology but have been suppressed or even 
excluded during its construction; it hence ignores deep-seated political biases in technological choice, 
and power struggles by which the initial agenda of technological development was set.  
(3) Social constructivism disregards that technological change involves dynamics beyond those 
revealed by studying the characteristics and actions of relevant social groups, such as deeper cultural, 
intellectual, or social origins of social choices about technology, and autonomous properties of 
technology.  
(4) Social constructivism does not take evaluative stances or invoke moral or political principles; 
indeed it apparently disdains evaluative stances.  
Winner's criticism took as its main target what I have identified as strong social constructivism, 
particularly the SCOT approach. Most of these criticisms, however, also apply to actor-network and 
mild constructivist approaches.  
At the time that Winner's article was published, these four statements about (strong) social 
constructivism were for the most part accurate. Since then, however, there have been some significant 
changes in social constructivist practice. Before discussing these changes, I will first consider the 
extent to which Winner's criticisms do indeed reveal fundamental flaws in the social constructivist 
approach to technology studies. Most of Winner's criticisms, I claim, do not point to internal 
methodological flaws in social constructivism, but criticize the narrowness of its scope and the 
consequently limited social and political relevance of its studies. Apparently, social constructivists 
have chosen to draw the scope of their field so as to exclude analyses of consequences, analyses of 
impacted social groups and initial settings of the agenda, and evaluative and normative claims. They 
would argue that their principal aim, to explain technical change, turns out to be possible without such 
analyses. These delimitations, then, may not point to inherent flaws in their methodology, but only to 
a narrowness in their methodology and in their aims.  
Only Winner's third criticism questions the adequacy of the explanatory framework of constructivist 
technology studies on strictly methodological grounds. This criticism is important, however, as it 
questions the power of social constructivist micro-level sociological analyses to explain the dynamics 
of technological choice, and suggests that these need to be supplemented with macro-level analyses or 
analyses that involve reference to nonsocial factors. Whether this criticism by Winner is justified will 
be discussed in sections 5 and 6.  
Although the narrowness of the scope of social constructivism is for the most part defensible on 
methodological grounds, its result is that the use of social constructivist studies for addressing issues 
in the philosophy of technology is more limited than it could conceivably have been. The greatest 
worth of social constructivist technology studies for the philosophy of technology lies in their detailed 
empirical analyses of the way in which technological development is a contingent, heterogeneous 
process involving interpretation and social negotiation, and the way in which the resulting technology 
is socially shaped. As indicated in section 3, such studies are relevant for studies in philosophy of 
technology in as far as these depend on some conception of technological development and the 
character of technology. They imply a corrective to technological determinist theories of development, 
and indicate how during the development stage of technology, many of its social and cultural effects 
are already built in. In this way, they also indicate the possibilities for alternative technologies (which 
has been a theme in the philosophy of technology), as well as possible points of intervention in the 
process of technological development.  
Because of the narrowness in scope of constructivist technology studies, however, philosophers of 
technology will often have to look elsewhere if they are looking for empirical studies of impacts of 
technology and of initial settings of the agenda and the exclusion of social groups in technological 
innovation, or for "deeper" social and cultural factors that play a role in technological development. 
Their own (macro-level) evaluative or political analyses, moreover, will not be able to take a leaf from 
any (micro-level) evaluative analyses performed by social constructivists.  
It should be noted, though, that in the past six years, some significant changes have taken place in the 
content of social constructivism. It looks as if some social constructivists have taken Winner's critique 
seriously. First, there are now more studies in which the social consequences of technical choice are 
considered. Social (and environmental) impacts are still not a main concern of social constructivist 
studies, however, and their analyses of social consequences tend to be unconventional. Some studies, 
mainly occurring within a social shaping or actor-network approach, analyze the way in which social 
consequences are "built into" technologies (e.g., Akrich, 1992; Latour, 1992; MacKenzie and 
Wajcman, 1985a). Others study the way in which "truths" about the consequences of a technology are 
socially negotiated and constructed (e.g., Bruhèze, 1992; Bijker, 1992, 1995). What both approaches 
have in common is that they reject a conventional, technological-determinist conception of 
technological impacts according to which technologies "impinge on" societies and bring about 
changes. Instead, they adopt a conception of consequences as resulting wholly or in part from social 
interpretation and negotiation, rather than (just) from intrinsic features of the technology in question.  
Second, more attention has been paid by social constructivists to excluded social groups in technical 
choice and initial settings of technological agendas. As argued by Aibar (1995, 1996) in a defense of 
the SCOT approach, excluded social groups can be accounted for by analyzing the statics and 
dynamics of their technological frame. A technological frame is the repository of knowledge, cultural 
values, goals, practices, and exemplary artifacts shared by a social group, which structures their 
attributions of meaning to objects and processes in technical innovation, and their subsequent actions.6 
In analyzing a particular process of technological innovation, the analyst can choose to include not 
only the technological frame of social groups that have been influential in determining the outcome of 
this process, but also the technological frame, and changes therein, of groups that have failed to have 
their voice heard.  
A related way in which social groups and choices excluded in the setting of the technological agenda 
can be included in social constructivist analysis is by the notion of the script of technical artifacts, a 
notion that has been introduced into the actor-network approach by Madeleine Akrich (1992) and 
Bruno Latour (1992). In technological design, design constituencies inscribe a vision of the world into 
their designs. Designs consequently embody a script: they harbor expectations about the 
characteristics of users, social relations, the use environment, and so forth, and stimulate or even 
demand conformity to this vision. Studying the process of inscription and the resulting script of an 
artifact enables the analyst to reveal how designs exclude certain social groups, or work against their 
interests in other ways.7  
Third, influential proponents of social constructivist technology studies recognized early on that its 
micro-level analyses, in which the technical content of design is explained by reference to the 
characteristics and actions of relevant social groups, need to be placed in a broader, macro-level 
context, in which technical content and the characteristics and actions of social groups are related to 
the wider social, political, and cultural milieu in which they are found (e.g., Pinch and Bijker, 1987, p. 
46). Initially, little attention was given to this item on the agenda of constructivist technology studies. 
Recently, though, such studies have started to appear (e.g., Rosen, 1993; Carlson, 1992; Bijker, 1992, 
1995 chaps. 4 and 5; Pfaffenberger, 1992). Typically, these studies translate macro-level variables, 
such as power relations or characteristics of the culture, into cultural values and goals in the technical 
frames of relevant social groups. What still remains difficult for most social constructivist approaches 
is to account for any "autonomous" features of technology: ways in which the use of technology can 
have consequences that are neither intended nor anticipated by any social group. This issue will be 
discussed at length in the coming sections.  
Fourth, there has been an increasing interest by social constructivists in normative and political issues 
concerning the role of technology in society (e.g., Bijker, 1993, 1995; Aibar, 1995, 1996), and in the 
actualities and potentialities of normative and political analysis within a social constructivist 
framework (e.g., Radder, 1992; Grint and Woolgar, 1995, 1996; Bijker, 1993, 1995; Aibar, 1996; 
Jasanoff, 1996). It must be observed, however, that many of these studies reject conventional 
normative and political analyses of the sort often found in mainstream philosophy of technology. The 
principle of symmetry obeyed in most of these studies prevents the analyst from taking a stand and 
prescribes methodological neutrality. Many social constructivists have argued that in spite of the 
principle of symmetry, or perhaps because of it, their analyses have political consequences, and argue 
for the possibility of a social constructivist politics. The very possibility of such a politics will be 
discussed in section 6.  
All in all, it appears that the scope of constructivist technology studies is widening in a way that is 
interesting to philosophers of technology wishing to apply constructivist studies to their own research. 
However, there appear to be important tensions between some of the key assumptions of social 
constructivist technology studies and those of mainstream philosophy of technology. These 
differences must be overcome before such applications are rendered unproblematic. Three such 
tensions have been indicated so far. First, social constructivist studies appear to have an 
unconventional conception of technological effects. Second, social constructivist studies often seem to 
deny the possibility of unintended and unanticipated consequences of technical choice, whereas 
philosophers of technology tend to affirm the existence of such consequences. Third, social 
constructivists tend to have a different conception of political and normative analysis than do 
philosophers of technology, and often seem to reject conventional normative analyses as incompatible 
with a social constructivist approach.  
Philosophers of technology may reject social constructivist models because of these deviances, but 
they may also see such models as posing a challenge to conventional assumptions in the philosophy of 
technology. In the remainder of this essay, I choose to meet this challenge by analyzing social 
constructivist conceptions of technological effects, unintended consequences of technical choice, and 
politics. I will also try to point out how the corresponding social constructivist models can be 
employed by philosophers of technology to arrive at novel analyses of the (intended and unintended) 
impacts of technology, and at novel kinds of evaluative and political studies of technology. This 
analysis needs to take place for each of the three varieties of social constructivism that have been 
distinguished in section 3. Mild social constructivist and actor-network approaches will be discussed 
in section 5, and strong social constructivist approaches will be treated in section 6.  
5. MILD SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM, ACTOR-NETWORK THEORY,  
AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY  
Mild social constructivism acknowledges that technologies are capable of having effects, although 
such effects are strongly dependent on the social context in which the technology is used. It tends to 
avoid reference to effects, though, because its focus tends to be on technological innovation, and not 
on the impacts of technology. It is often concerned with deconstructing the way in which new 
technologies are stabilized as the result of the heterogeneous action of different actors. Mild social 
constructivism also appears compatible with there being unintended consequences of technical choice. 
Because it does not adopt the view that technologies are wholly socially constructed, it is not 
committed to the view that any effect must be explained by reference to (conscious) social choices.  
Moreover, mild social constructivist analyses can take a normative or political slant by analyzing the 
way in which particular technologies, designed for use within a particular use environment, come to 
embody a particular politics or particular social effects. The political significance of such studies can 
be exploited by breaking with the symmetry principle, and by using the studies to make explicitly 
political and normative statements, such as statements about the "success" of certain social groups in 
promoting their interests through a particular technology, or the "suppression" of other social groups 
through a technological innovation. Winner's famous article on political artifacts (1980), for example, 
is presented in MacKenzie and Wajcman (1985a) as an example of a "social shaping" approach in 
technology studies. However, Winner's analysis breaks with the principle of methodological symmetry 
upheld in many studies in the social shaping approach by privileging some of the many effects of 
technologies over others because of their claimed political relevance, relating these effects to a 
definite cause that is found in the design history of the technology, and making evaluative statements 
about the political significance of these effects.  
In his recent philosophical work, Andrew Feenberg (1992, 1995) also adopts a social constructivism 
that is probably best classified as mild.8 In Feenberg (1992), for example, he uses social constructivist 
doctrines to update the Frankfurt School approach, and to argue that technology is subject to 
conscious social control. He argues that modern technology embodies political values that promote 
hierarchy and domination, whereas social constructivist studies show that a radically different, 
democratized technology is possible. Such an alternative technology is possible if more social groups 
participate in technical choice, and if technological development is consequently brought under 
democratic control. Feenberg concludes by arguing that there is a need for such democratic control, 
and for challenges to prevailing conceptions of technological rationality. Like Winner, Feenberg 
transcends the methodological symmetry in social constructivist studies by making evaluative claims. 
It hence appears that, by selectively breaking with the symmetry principle, philosophers can use mild 
social constructivist studies as a starting point for evaluative and political analyses.  
In spite of its pretenses to being radical (e.g., Callon and Latour, 1992), actor-network theory often 
treats technology in a way that superficially resembles the analyses of social shaping approaches, by 
liberally assigning properties, powers and effects to technologies. Artifacts can have effects because 
they can act, just like human beings. Consequently, they can also have unintended effects, just like an 
individual can perform actions that were neither intended nor anticipated by others.  
Although studies in actor-network theory do not normally contain political or evaluative claims about 
technologies and their impacts, these studies can provide an empirical basis for such claims by 
philosophers of technology in much the same way as do studies within a social shaping approach. For 
example, the notion of the "script" of an artifact (discussed above, in section 4), appears to be an 
actor-network idiom referring to the politics of artifacts. As Latour (1992) claims, artifacts harbor a 
large part of the morality of a society in their scripts or "programs" (Latour, 1995). They issue 
prescriptions for the behavior of their users, and help to impose a moral structure on society. If 
Latour's analysis is correct, then actor-network studies of scripts provide a starting point for normative 
and political analyses of the scripts of artifacts and their inscription into artifacts by design 
constituencies.  
6. STRONG SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM AND THE  
PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY  
Reference to technologies having effects or politics or indeed to them as having any fixed property is 
difficult within strong social constructivism, because of its strict adherence to the symmetry principle. 
References to unintended effects are even more problematic, because to the extent that technologies 
can even be claimed to have effects, these effects are claimed to result from social choices, and are 
therefore, it would seem, not wholly unintended; strong social constructivism seems to imply that 
every event is socially determined, and therefore within social control. Reference to properties or 
effects of technology is not only problematic in strong social constructivism, it is often also not seen 
as part of the task of the analyst. The task of the analyst is to deconstruct technologies by analyzing 
the processes by which technologies are stabilized and by which "closure" is reached on their 
properties. Technology is sometimes metaphorically described as a "text" that is "read" by different 
actors in different ways, and the task of the analyst is to analyze how the text of technology is 
"written" by different actors, and how particular "readings" of it come to prevail (Woolgar, 1991; 
Grint and Woolgar, 1995); the task of the analyst is not to select a particular "reading" of a 
technology, i.e., her own reading, and present it as a "correct" reading.  
Still, as Bijker (1995) has argued, a strong social constructivism does not require a complete 
abandonment of the notion of technologies having effects. In the SCOT approach, a "social impact" of 
a technology is defined as a modification of the technological frame of a social group (see section 2), 
as a consequence of the "stabilization" of a particular technology within this technological frame. As 
an example, Bijker analyzes the development of fluorescent lighting. Different interpretations of 
fluorescent lighting existed, but the particular social construction that was settled on was a "high-
intensity daylight fluorescent lamp." This social construction required changes in the technological 
frames of various relevant social groups, such as the adoption of new scientific theories, goals, and 
practices. These changes, then, are social impacts of the introduction of fluorescent lighting. Notice, 
however, that according to Bijker's analysis these impacts were not generated by any intrinsic 
properties of fluorescent lamps but instead derive from the particular way in which fluorescent 
lighting was socially constructed.  
The notion of "artifacts having politics," which is rejected by strong social constructivists, can also be 
seen to survive in a different form. Pfaffenberger (1992) adopts the "technology-as-text" metaphor, 
and argues against Winner that artifacts do not have politics, not even relative to a particular social 
context. Instead, Pfaffenberger argues, if an artifact is to have political effects it "must be discursively 
regulated by surrounding it with symbolic media that mystify and therefore constitute the political 
aims" (p. 294). In other words, a technology, as a mere text, does not force a particular reading. 
Readings are determined, instead, by dominant discourses surrounding a technology, that prescribe 
how the technology should be read. The political impact of a new technology therefore cannot be 
attributed to this technology itself, but must be attributed instead to the "symbolic discourses" that 
compel a particular interpretation and usage of it. An attempt to change the politics of a technology 
therefore does not require its substitution by a different technology (a "rewriting" of the text) but can 
be achieved by challenging the symbolic discourses surrounding the technology and by introducing 
alternative readings.9  
The notion of "unintended effects," finally, may also be argued to survive in some form in a strong 
social constructivist approach. As Bijker (1995) has argued, actors are not always fully in control of 
their technological frame, and cannot change it at will. Consequently, "stabilized" technologies may 
transform technological frames in ways that no actor fully controls:  
An artifact in the role of exemplar (that is, after closure, when it is part of a technological frame) has 
become obdurate. The relevant social groups have, in building up the technological frame, invested so 
much in the artifact that its meaning has become quite fixed--it cannot be changed easily, and it forms 
part of a hardened network of practices, theories, and social institutions. From this time on it may 
indeed happen that, naively spoken, an artifact "determines" social development (p. 282).  
Notice, however, that what is having an impact on society is here not an independently existing 
artifact, but instead a socially constructed artifact that affects other social constructions in the 
technological frames of social groups, in a way not fully controlled by these social groups.10  
Although the symmetry principle seems to rule out evaluative and political analyses, many of those 
who adopt a strong social constructivism nevertheless argue that its analyses embody, or are able to 
result in, a kind of politics. Bijker (1995), for example, argues that social constructivist studies are 
able to support a social constructivist "politics of technology" even when they obey the principle of 
symmetry and merely deconstruct particular social constructions.11 Such a politics does not require 
that the analyst make evaluative statements or prescribe courses of action. Rather, the political agenda 
of social constructivist studies should be to show "the malleability of technology, the possibility for 
choice, the basic insight that things could have been otherwise" (p. 280), and also to point to the 
obduracy of stabilized technologies and other stabilized objects, and the limitations that these impose 
on attempts to change technology and its social impacts. Strong social constructivist studies are hence 
political by revealing the contingency or politics contained in technological choice. This information 
can subsequently be used by actors with a political agenda to influence technical change, including the 
"social impacts" of technologies.  
Bijker admits that there is no guarantee that social constructivist studies will have political impacts 
that are desirable. Ideally, social constructivist studies would aid less privileged social groups by 
showing them how stronger parties impose a particular political hegemony, and they could resist this 
hegemony and exert more influence over technology. However, as Bijker points out, these studies may 
also work against less privileged groups by undermining their attempts at stabilizing certain social 
constructions, handing tools to stronger parties to exert still more influence over technology. Bijker's 
hope, however, is that social constructivist studies will have a political bias towards stimulating 
democratic control of technology, by showing to citizens that influence on technology's course is 
possible, even in the "diffusion" stage of a technology (see Bijker, 1993, p. 131).  
There is no convincing evidence, however, that social constructivist analyses systematically favor less 
privileged groups. Instead, Jasanoff (1996) presents examples of the use of social constructivist 
studies by powerful actors to promote their interests; these confirm Bijker's worry that social 
constructivist analyses do not necessarily favor less privileged groups. Moreover, Martin (1993) has 
argued that there is little evidence that social constructivist studies work to aid less privileged groups. 
Perhaps social constructivist politics is a good idea in theory, but there is no convincing evidence that 
it works to stimulate positive political change in practice.  
I tentatively conclude that social constructivist politics, in its current form, is unsatisfactory. If 
political analysis is desired, it seems more attractive for authors of social constructivist studies to 
study powerful and less privileged groups asymmetrically, siding with the less privileged group in 
their analyses (Martin, 1993; Scott, Richards and Martin, 1990). More specifically, the analyst may 
attempt to adopt the technological frame of less privileged groups, and present analyses from this 
perspective that are claimed to represent the "actual character" of a technology and its "real impacts" 
even though the analyst may be aware that her own analysis is also a "mere" social construction. Such 
a realist analysis may suggest specific courses of action to these groups, and be more directly helpful 
in this way than analyses that are merely deconstructive (Soper, 1995; Kling, 1992; Gill, 1996).12  
7. CONCLUSION  
Social constructivist studies pose interesting challenges to the philosophy of technology, presenting 
nondeterministic models of technological change, and arguing that the choices made in technical 
innovation in large part determine the social impacts of technologies. This emphasis on the 
development stage of technology has been shown to result in interesting analyses of technologies, as 
being "socially shaped" or having a "script," that provide a potentially fruitful basis for normative and 
evaluative philosophical analyses of technology and its impacts. Even the strong variety of social 
constructivism allows for evaluative and political analysis, by studying the ways in which 
technologies are socially constructed by different parties and exploring the possibilities for alternative 
social constructions by "reading" technologies differently, thus subverting dominant technological 
frames. (In these cases, normative and evaluative philosophical analysis requires that the symmetry 
principle upheld by social constructivists be disobeyed.) Although a full investigation of the 
methodological and empirical adequacy of social constructivist approaches is beyond the scope of this 
essay, these approaches, if valid, do suggest new directions for the philosophy of technology.  
NOTES  
1. I would like to thank Annemieke Nelis, Martijntje Smits, Tsjalling Swierstra, and Peter Paul 
Verbeek for their comments on an earlier draft.  
2. The converse question, of how social constructivist analyses could benefit from work in the 
philosophy of technology, will not be addressed.  
3. Empirical technology studies is not the only empirical discipline helpful to the philosophy of 
technology. For philosophical analyses of the social and cultural implications of technology, a good 
knowledge of general sociology, anthropology, and cultural studies could also prove beneficial.  
4. To be precise, my analysis adopts Sismondo's distinction between mild and strong social 
constructivism, but holds, unlike Sismondo's typology, that the SCOT approach (Pinch and Bijker, 
1987) is best understood as a form of strong social constructivism. It also adopts the common 
distinction between social constructivism as exemplified by the SCOT approach, and actor-network 
theory. Moreover, strong social constructivism, in my analysis, corresponds with what Grint and 
Woolgar (1995) call "post-essentialism" and "the constitutive variant of anti-essentialism." Mild social 
constructivism corresponds with the remaining forms of anti-essentialism. My typology should be 
understood as describing ideal types, and approaches exist that fall in between these ideal types.  
5. Included in social shaping approaches may be the systems approach that has been developed by 
Hughes (1987), as well as most work in feminist technology studies (e.g., Wajcman, 1991).  
6. The notion of technological frame has been introduced by Bijker (1987, 1993, 1995).  
7. A third, promising notion within (strong) social constructivist technology studies was recently 
presented by Pfaffenberger (1992). Pfaffenberger argues that the introduction of new technologies is 
normally accompanied by a series of moves and countermoves by relevant social groups, a series of 
events that he calls a technological drama. The analysis of technological dramas does not just reveal 
the role of social groups that are successful in shaping the technology according to their interests, but 
also the role of impacted groups that are unsuccessful in doing so.  
8. Although Feenberg (1992) mostly draws from the SCOT approach, which is here classified as a 
type of strong social constructivism, Feenberg only adopts the assumptions made in SCOT that there 
is room for social choice in technological innovation, and that technologies have interpretive 
flexibility. Both these claims do not go beyond those of mild social constructivism (see Sismondo, 
1993). Some of the analyses in Feenberg (1995), however, seem to come close to embracing the 
strong social constructivism discussed in section 6.  
9. A similar analysis is presented by Bijker (1995, pp. 262-264), who argues for a semiotic conception 
of power, according to which power is "the apparent order of taken-for-granted categories of 
existence, as they are fixed and represented in technological frames" (p. 263). Artifacts hence are not 
political in themselves, but derive their political power from the semiotic structure in which they are 
embedded.  
10. The acknowledgment that technological change and the social impacts of technology are not just 
the outcome of "explicitly planned, rationally decided, conscious action" has a price, as Bijker is 
aware. Social constructivist studies cannot fully account for technical change by reference to the 
actions of different social groups. They also need to recognize structural constraints on technical 
change. According to Bijker, these structural constraints are found in the semiotic structures, or 
categories, that stabilize elements in technological frames. Notice, however, that this reference to 
semiotic structure seems to open the door to functionalist and structuralist accounts of technical 
change (see Elster, 1983), which is probably not what Bijker has in mind.  
11. See Grint and Woolgar (1995, 1996) for a related proposal for a social constructivist politics, 
which they call "post-essentialist politics." See also Mol and Mesman (1996).  
12. Some social constructivists have criticized politically motivated realist analyses, because they 
argue that realist analyses are politically dangerous. Thus, Elam (1994), in a critique of Winner 
(1991), argues that adherence to "the truth" even in the name of a "politically correct" analysis, goes 
against the very foundations of a liberal politics. According to Elam, liberal politics requires one to 
refrain from enforcing one's views on others, and hence from presenting any of one's views as true. 
Similarly, Woolgar (1993) claims: "Definitive versions of the 'actual political' character of, say, 
Moses' bridges must be resisted, because there is a very real danger of accepting any political 
interpretation in the guise of its being true" (p. 527). Woolgar holds that the very denial that any view 
qualifies as "true" or as superior to other views is in the interest of protecting fundamental liberties. 
Neither party, however, acknowledges a difference between merely claiming that a statement is true 
and dogmatic adherence to the truth of a statement, and neither party presents an argument that 
presenting statements as true works to undermine fundamental liberties.  
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